

Abhinaba Nandy

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EDUCATION **Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University**, Virginia, USA
Ph.D., Economics 2022 (expected)

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India,
M.Phil., Development Economics, 2015

University of Calcutta, Calcutta, India,
M.Sc Economics, 2013

University of Calcutta, Calcutta, India
B.Sc, Economics, 2011

FIELDS OF INTEREST Political Economy, Industrial Organization, Network Economics

DISSERTATION Essays in Political Economy

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Sudipta Sarangi (*Co-Chair*), Matt Kovach(*Co-Chair*), Gerelt Tsenrejimid, Niloy Bose

WORKING PAPERS Media bias in the best and worst of times (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: Readers of news have preference for news sources which are closer to their beliefs. I use this fact to develop a Hotelling's linear city model of competition between two ideologically different media firms which are supplying information about a given topic. While reporting any topic, media fulfils its two motives- ideology payoff and better assessment of its news from readers. Readers assess news based on their own ideology and the facts related to the topic. I find that competition can lead both firms to provide accurate information regarding some topics but deviate from each other while reporting others. If the topic is unfavorable to a media's ideology, then it either reports to defend its ideology, implying a detachment of its ideology from the topic or delivers a closely accurate report of the unfavorable event. Interestingly, when the topic is unfavorable, the media refrains from reporting in an indifferent manner. By the standard Hotelling's result, readers incur a transportation cost when they read news distant from their own ideology. In the current model, I show conditions when such results fail to hold such that readers give better assessment to news of a media placed farther away from their ideology

than one which is nearer. In the absence of competition, welfare decreases as the media gains license to bias news regarding unfavorable topics. On the other hand, the entry of a third firm does not necessarily enhance the welfare levels of the economy. Policy prescriptions like educating readers to stress more attention on facts can lead to readers willingly accepting an accurate report about a topic which carries opposite ideology.

Sanctions in trade networks

Abstract: Sanctions are common policy measures taken by an agent (sender) to discipline another agent (target) when the latter has violated any norm. Empirically, it has been observed that import sanctions are not only more prevalent than export sanctions but also more effective in disciplining the target. I examine that such differences in efficacy of import and export sanctions can be explained by the underlying network architecture which is captured by one special measure of node centrality (betweenness centrality). This value of node centrality directs senders which type of sanction to impose which will also be welfare improving. This method also shows conditions when efficacy of sanctions will be weakened under geopolitical tensions between sender and target.

WORK
IN PROGRESS

Persuasion under Cheap Talk

Abstract: This paper examines the influence of cheap talk message from a sender to a receiver. The sender is biased and wants the receiver to take one particular costly action by sending a cheap talk message. For instance, consider a political cadre sending a message to persuade a voter to come out and vote during pandemic. So taking the action can infect the voter, while not taking the action keeps her safe but she loses the chance to vote. I first analyse what forms of cheap talk will succeed in making this voter to vote. The second theme of this paper is to understand this cheap talk game when the receiver has ‘Wishful Thinking’. This aspect within a receiver makes her optimistic about future outcomes and cheap messages become more successful in persuading her to take a costly action.

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Microeconomic Theory (Undergraduate), Virginia Tech, Summer 2021

Instructor, Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Virginia Tech, Spring 2021, Spring 2020

UNDERGRADUATE
TEACHING
ASSISTANTSHIP

Teaching Assistant, Fundamentals of Behavioral Decision Science (Interdisciplinary), Fall 2021

Teaching Assistant, Analysis of Economic Data, Fall 2020

Teaching Assistant, Economics of Regulation, Fall 2020

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Game Theory and Strategic Reasoning , Ashoka University, Delhi, India, Summer 2020

Teaching Assistant, Macroeconomic Theory, Fall 2019

Teaching Assistant, Analysis of Economic Data, Spring 2019

Teaching Assistant, Evidence Based Policy Design, Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant, Analysis of Economic Data, Spring 2018

Teaching Assistant, Data Based Policy Making, Fall 2017

GRADUATE
TEACHING
ASSISTANTSHIP

Teaching Assistant, Mathematical Economics, Virginia Tech, Fall 2021,

RESEARCH
EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India,
July 2015-July 2016

FELLOWSHIPS
AND AWARDS

Recipient of “Rising Scholar Award”, Summer 2019

Graduate Assistant Tuition Fellowship, Virginia Tech, 2017-Present

Reserve Bank of India M.Phil Fellowship, 2013-2015

PRESENTATIONS

Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, June 2021

COMPUTER
SKILLS

Python, Microsoft Office, L^AT_EX

REFEREEING
SERVICES

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Public Economic Theory

AFFILIATIONS

Econometric Society

INDUSTRY
EXPERIENCE

J.P Morgan Chase, (July 2015- June 2017), Mumbai India
Division of Credit Line Assignment

LANGUAGES

English (Proficient), Hindi (Proficient), Bengali (Native)

CITIZENSHIP/
VISA

India/F1 Visa

REFERENCES

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